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RUNYON V. MCCRARY: SECTION 1981 OPENS THE
DOORS OF DISCRIMINATORY PRIVATE SCHOOLS
Discrimination in public education has been considered unconstitutional since the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of
Education' over two decades ago. The Brown decision repudiated the
doctrine of "separate but equal" 2 in the field of public education' and
eliminated the numerous dual school systems prevalent at that time
throughout the United States.4 As a response to the integration that
followed Brown and subsequent public school discrimination cases,'
numerous "segregation academies" were established in the South.6
A "segregation academy" is a private school which operates on a
racially segregated basis as an alternative for white students seeking
to avoid desegregated public schools.7 As these private schools multiplied, various forms of both overt and covert state and local governmental assistance emerged to provide support. Federal courts, however, consistently invalidated such aid as violations of the states'
affirmative duty to desegregate their schools under the equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth amendment.'
Although most segregated private schools are now divorced from
state action? and beyond the requirements of fourteenth amendment
1 347 U.S.

483 (1954).
2 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy sanctioned the development
of dual facilities to be used according to the individual's race. The case specifically
approved segregated railway accommodiations under the "separate but equal" doctrine. Id. at 548-52.
3347 U.S. at 495.
Prior to Brown, many states operated dual public school systems, one for white
children and the other for black children, based on the "separate but equal" doctrine
advanced in Plessy. See generally Kauper, Segregation In Public Education: The
Decline of Plessy v. Ferguson, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 1137 (1954).
See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (required states to
take affirmative action to establish unitary, non-racial school systems).
I See Note, Segregation Academies And State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Academies].
I See Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389, 1392 (S.D. Miss.
1969).
'Academies, supra note 6, at 1444-61. See, e.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery,
417 U.S. 556 (1974) (prohibiting use of city parks for private school activities); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (prohibiting state-supplied textbooks in private
schools); Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La.
1967), aff'd mem., 389 U.S. 571 (1968) (prohibiting state tuition grants to private
school students).
I See cases cited note 8 supra.
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equal protection, 0 they continue to pose "a significant threat to the
existence of an effective system of desegregated public education in
much of the South."" In Runyon v. McCrary,2 the Supreme Court
applied 42 U.S.C. § 198113 to the discriminatory admissions policies
of these institutions. The Court in Runyon considered for the first
time whether federal law prohibits private schools from excluding
qualified children solely because of their race. 4 In an opinion by
Justice Stewart, the Court held that the racial exclusion practiced by
the schools "amounts to a classic violation of § 1981." 15 In reaching
this decision, the Runyon Court resolved two basic questions:
whether § 1981 prohibits private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from denying admission to prospective students because of their race, and, if so, whether that federal law is constitutional as applied."
These questions reached the Court through allegations by the
respondents, black children appealing through their parents, that the
petitioners, proprietors of Bobbe's Private School and FairfaxBrewster School, Inc., violated § 1981 by denying the respondents
admission to the schools because of their race. The Southern Independent School Association, a non-profit school association representing 395 private schools, intervened as a party defendant on behalf
of its members and stipulated that many of these schools deny admis8
sions to blacks.
Neither of the defendant schools had ever accepted a black child
for any of its programs. Nevertheless, both institutions promoted
their services to the public at large though brochures mailed to "resident" and through advertisements in the telephone directory. 9 The
parents of both children responded to one or more of these types of
advertisements, resulting in one unsuccessful application for admis'"The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), held that before any activity can be
brought within the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, it must be
supported by state authority in some manner. Id. at 17.
1 Academies, supra note 6, at 1440.
1296 S. Ct. 2586 (1976).
1342 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). Section 1981 states in part that "[all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right. . . to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens ..
" 96 S. Ct. at 2590.
Id. at 2595.
" Id. at 2592-93.
'7 See Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va.
1973).
1196 S. Ct. at 2591.
19 Id.
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sion to Fairfax-Brewster. Further applications were discouraged when
the parents' telephone calls to the institutions revealed that the chil2
dren were unacceptable because of their race. 1
The district court found that both children were denied admission
to the schools solely on racial grounds and held the discriminatory
admissions policies illegal under § 1981.21 Affirming the district
court's findings, the Fourth Circuit held that the schools' policies
violated § 1981 when the sole basis of exclusion was racial.2 2 The court
reasoned that under those circumstances the black applicant is denied a contractual right to educational services which would have
22
been granted to him if he had been white.
In affirming the appellate decision, the Supreme Court concluded
that § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts. 2 The majority reasoned that although the
schools advertised and offered their educational services to the general public, they did not extend these services equally to white and
non-white students. Since the schools had refused to contract with
the respondents because of their race, the Court held that both institutions had violated § 1981.2
The majority determined that the legislative history of § 1981
clearly established that the statute encompassed private actions,2 6
and that applying the section's inherent prohibitions to the schools'
discriminatory conduct was an appropriate exercise of federal legislative power under the enforcement clause of the thirteenth amendSee McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1085 (4th Cir. 1975).
F. Supp. at 1203-04. The district court reasoned that the telephone conversations between both children's parents and the schools clearly demonstrated that the
21 363

institutions followed exclusionary admissions policies. Under the court's rationale,
private conduct such as this is prohibited by § 1981 because it had been prohibited
under § 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968). Since neither of these sections require state action before they are applied, see
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973), the court

decided that § 1981 appropriately prohibited the schools from discriminating in their
admissions. The court further dismissed the contention that the schools were "truly
private" because the opportunity to attend them was open to every white child. 363
F. Supp. at 1204.
21

515 F.2d at 1087.

" Id. See PrivateDiscrimination,Fourth Circuit Review, 33 WASH. & LEE L. Rv.
472, 472-79 (1976); Comment, Civil Rights-Private Education-Right to Contract
Provisionof 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ProhibitsRacially DiscriminatoryAdmissions Policies
in Private Schools, 25 EMORY L.J. 209 (1976).
2196

S. Ct. at 2593.

Id. at 2595.
Id. at 2593-96.
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ment. 27 This decision, however, recognized that countervailing constitutional issues must be considered. The Court conceded that the first
amendment freedom of association protected both the parents' right
to send their child to a school which advocates racial segregation as
a desirable social concept, and a child's right to attend such an institution.29 Nevertheless, it declined to apply that freedom to the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions."
The petitioners raised an analogous issue by arguing that § 1981
conflicted with the liberty of parents to direct the upbringing and
education of their children, a right protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3 1 The majority in Runyon rejected this reasoning, stating that the schools remained "presumptively free to inculcate whatever values and standards they deem
desirable. 31 In the Court's opinion, however, the parents' liberty to
expose their children to these values and standards marked the limits
of due process protection.n The Court also considered the parents'
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. The thirteenth amendment abolished involuntary servitude and established civil and political freedom for former slaves throughout
the United States. Section 2 of the amendment enables Congress to enforce the article
by appropriate legislation, empowering it "to pass all laws necessary and proper for
abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery." The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20
(1883). The Supreme Court there determined that this power reached beyond the
state-action limitations of the fourteenth amendment to the acts of individuals. 109
U.S. at 23. Upon the basis of this reasoning, the Runyon Court relied solely on the
authority of the thirteenth amendment. 96 S. Ct. at 2593-96.
The Court used the "badge of slavery" concept in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968), as constitutional support for prohibiting private racial discrimination in the sale or rental of realty under § 1982, now 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). Likewise,
the Runyon Court's interpretation of a refusal to contract under § 1981 reaffirmed that
section's link to thirteenth amendment authority. See 96 S. Ct. at 2594-95.
Justices Powell and Stevens concurred in this result in Runyon but they expressed
apprehension over the majority's interpretation of the legislative history of § 1981.
Both justices believed, however, that a reversal on the historical basis would constitute
a major blow to national policy favoring the elimination of racial discrimination. See
96 S. Ct. at 2601-04. Justice Powell also voiced concern that the majority opinion might
be construed more broadly than is justified. He emphasized that, although § 1981
necessarily extended to certain acts of private individuals, the statute did not apply
to all private conduct. In Justice Powell's opinion, choices reflecting the selectivity of
an individual relationship which are "private" in that they are not widely offered as
part of a commercial relationship, certainly were never intended to be restricted by
the legislation passed to enforce the thirteenth amendment. 96 S. Ct. at 2603.
See text accompanying notes 91-107 infra.
96 S. Ct. at 2597.
' Id. See text accompanying notes 108-115 infra.
3' See text accompanying notes 128-130 infra.
31 96 S. Ct. at 2597.
3 Id.
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decision concerning the manner of their child's education as part of
their familial rights and responsibilities protected by the right to
privacy.34 In this context, the majority stated that the right was not
beyond the bounds of reasonable government regulation, implying
that public policy favoring integration justified regulating the par5
ents' decision 2
Content to leave such policy considerations to Congress, 31.Justice
White dissented 37 from the majority view that the legislative history
of § 1981 supports a cause of action for a private refusal to contract
because of race. Construing the statute's "same right" language3 as
conferring only the legal capacity to contract, Justice White found
that the legislative history established that Congress relied solely
upon the fourteenth amendment in passing § 1981.31 Under this interpretation the statute could only reach state action directed at impairing a person's legal capacity to contract. 0 Justice White also feared
that the majority's holding might launch a judicial assault upon other
areas of private discrimination with a resultant diminishing of associational and privacy interests. In his view, this would be a task
requiring a balancing of considerations more appropriately within the
province of Congress.4
To apply § 1981 to the discriminatory policies of the schools, the
Runyon majority had to determine whether that section was designed
to prevent such practices. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,4" the
3' See text accompanying notes 131-137 infra.
See 96 S. Ct. at 2597.
Id. at 2614.
37 Id. at 2604.
11 See note 13 supra.
3, See text accompanying notes 47-58 infra.
See generally Note, State Action: TheoriesForApplying ConstitutionalRestrictions To PrivateActivity, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 656 (1974).
11 Justice White was particularly concerned with the possible extension of § 1981
to racially segregated private social clubs. 96 S. Ct. at 2613-14. See text accompanying
notes 138-154 infra for a discussion of the applicability of § 1981 in that context.
42 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Prior to Jones, §§ 1981 and 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982
(1970), had been construed to confer upon blacks only the legal capacity to make
contracts and purchase property. See, e.g., Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
The Supreme Court expressly rejected this rationale in Jones. 392 U.S. at 441 n.78.
Jones involved a developer's refusal to sell real estate in an exclusively white area to a
black. The Court held that § 1982 applied to purely private activity as a valid exercise
of congressional power under the enforcement clause of the thirteenth amendment,
U.S. CONST. amend. XHI, § 2. See note 27 supra.Designating private racial discrimination a badge of slavery, the majority found that § 1982 was rationally related to the
goal of eliminating vestiges of slavery. Thus, the Court held that the statute went
beyond conferring the mere legal capacity to contract to include the freedom to buy
whatever a white person could buy. 392 U.S. at 439-43.
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Supreme Court gave new meaning to § 1981 and its companion, §
1982,11 by prohibiting private racial discrimination in the sale or
rental of property." The Court's interpretation of the legislative history of these civil rights laws provided the cornerstone for Runyon
and other recent decisions attacking private discriminatory acts. 5
Thus, the validity of the Jones view of the legislative history determines whether § 1981 was properly applied in Runyon.
The legislative history of § 1981 has produced disagreement over
the scope and source of that section.46 In Runyon, the Court relied
principally on Jones and similar decisions" to establish that § 1981
prohibits private discrimination in the making and enforcement of
contracts."' Both the Jones holding" and its dictum extending § 1981
"' 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) states in part that "[aill citizens of the United States
shall have the same right. . . as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." See note 47 infra for an
explanation of why this statute is often considered a companion to § 1981.
4 392 U.S. at 437-44.
41 See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.; 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (applying § 1981 to private employment contracts); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation
Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973) (applying §§ 1981 and 1982 to admission to a recreational park which was part of a private housing development).
' See note 53 infra.
" See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973). In Tillman, the Supreme Court
extended the concept of property interests protected by § 1982 to rights incidental to
ownership. The Court was concerned specifically with the preference accorded residents of a geographic area by a community swimming pool association. The plaintiffs
in Tillman, a black couple who had bought a home in this area from a non-member,
alleged that the association discouraged their application for membership because of
their race. The Court held that by linking membership benefits to residency in a
narrow geographical area, the organization infused those benefits into the rights for
which one paid when he bought or leased property in this area. 410 U.S. at 437. Thus,
the association's refusal to grant the plaintiff the customary geographic preference
constituted a denial of the "same right" to buy property in the area that whites enjoyed
and therefore violated § 1982. Id. The Court also held that since the operative language
of both §§ 1981 and 1982 was traceable to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Act of April 9,
1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, the organization could not claim an exemption as a
private club under either section because race was the only selective element for
membership. 410 U.S. at 438-39.
In Johnson, the plaintiff alleged that he had been denied the "same right" to
contract as whites under § 1981 because of the defendant's discriminatory employment
practices. The Supreme Court held that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against racial
discrimination in private employment. 421 U.S. at 459-60.
1196 S. Ct. at 2594. The effect of this holding is to impose an affirmative obligation
to contract regardless of race. See note 58 infra for Justice White's argument against
this holding.
11392 U.S. at 437-44.
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to private discrimination 0 rested upon the Court's interpretation of
statements made during congressional debates concerning the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.1' In the Court's view, these statements amply
demonstrated that the Civil Rights Act of 1866, from which it believed both §§ 1981 and 1982 originated," was designed to proscribe
5
all racial discrimination, whether or not under color of law. 1
As Justice Harlan stated in his Jones dissent, however, the legislative history of the 1866 Act is not nearly so definitive a statement on
private discrimination as the majority believed." His discussion of
the legislative history rendered an equally compelling interpretation
of the "same right" language in § 1982 as conferring on blacks only
the legal capacity to buy and sell property.5 Significantly, the dissent
Id. at 441 n.78.
Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
52 See 392 U.S. at 422-37. The Tillman decision reinforced this result by specifically holding that the 1866 Act provided the operative language of §§ 1981 and 1982.
410 U.S. at 439.
0 392 U.S. at 436. This interpretation sparked a lively debate among commentators which, as Justice White's Runyon dissent demonstrates, is still active today. As
to the scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the majority interpreted statements such
as one made by Senator Trumbull of Illinois that the civil rights embodied in the bill
would "break down all discrimination between black and white men," CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866), as indicating that the statute reached beyond state
actions to the discriminatory conduct of private individuals. In Jones, Justice Harlan
opposed this reasoning with conflicting remarks by other congressmen and a statement
by the same Senator Trumbull that he introduced the bill to bring about "the passage
of a law by Congress, securing equality in civil rights when denied by State authorities
to freedmen and all other inhabitants of the United States ... " Id. at 1759. Justice
Harlan believed that the statute's language and the legislative history clearly indicated that the intent of Congress was to grant Negroes equal status before the law and
not to intrude upon purely private action. 392 U.S. 449 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The
much maligned legal capacity theory is premised on this reasoning. See note 58 infra.
Because the various arguments advanced concerning the Act's legislative history
are adequately treated elsewhere, this article will not discuss them in greater .depth.
For authority refuting the majority's interpretation see Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio,
Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 89; Ervin, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.: JudicialActivism Run Riot, 22 VAND. L. REv. 485 (1969); Henkin, Foreword: On
Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 82-91 (1968); Note, The "New" Thirteenth
Amendment: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1294, 1295-1300 (1969). For
authority supporting the majority's interpretation see Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of
1866, Its Hour Come Round At Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA.L. REV. 272
(1969); Note, FederalPower To Regulate PrivateDiscrimination:The Revival Of The
Enforcement Clauses Of The ReconstructionEra Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449,
450-79 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Private Discrimination];Note, Section 1981 and
Private Discrimination:An HistoricalJustification For A Judicial Trend, 40 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1023 (1972) [hereinafter cited as HistoricalJustification].
-,See 392 U.S. at 449-50 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5Id. at 454-73.
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drew this interpretation from the same debates that provided the
bulk of the majority's argument. 6
Justice White confronted virtually an identical interpretation
problem with § 1981 in his Runyon dissent. As one commentator has
recognized, the Jones interpretation of the "same right" to purchase
and lease property in § 1982 as encompassing more than mere civil
capacity may equally apply to the identical language in § 1981 guaranteeing blacks the "same right" to contract.57 In opposing the majority's extension of the Jones interpretation of the "same right" language into the area of private contracts, Justice White reasserted the
argument advanced by the Jones dissent that the language supports
only the traditional right to contract with any willing person. 5
Both interpretations of the legislative history of the 1866 Act command much support, but neither is more clearly compelling. 9 As the
debates indicate, it is probable that the conservative congressmen
favored the legal capacity construction while the liberal congressmen
favored a broader interpretation. These expressions of congressional
intent can be assembled as evidence to support either conclusion."
Because both interpretations are equally persuasive, the inevitable
conclusion to be drawn is that the legislative intent concerning § 1981
is virtually inscrutable and cannot provide a basis for determining
the statute's scope.
To anchor the body of civil rights law developing about §§ 1981
and 1982 on ambiguous and contradictory statements by legislators
hardly seems reliable. Indeed, even if their precise intent were known,
changing social conditions may necessarily suggest a different inter" See note 53 supra.

See Note, DesegregationOf PrivateSchools: Section 1981 As An Alternative To
State Action, 62 GEO. L.J. 1363, 1373 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Alternative Action].
5- 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2604 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White argued that
the right conferred by § 1981 was the right to make contracts with other willing parties
and enforce them in court, not the right to contract with anyone. In his view, the words
"rights. . . enjoyed by white citizens" referred to rights existing apart from the statute. General contract theory requires the assent of the contracting parties to the contract's terms as an element of any contract. Because this concept prevented a white
man from contracting with an unwilling private person in 1866 as well as today, no
matter what motivated the refusal, Justice White believed that the law prohibited only
state-imposed legal disabilities. 96 S. Ct. at 2605-06. Thus, Justice White maintained
the legal capacity interpretation advanced in the Jones dissent.
For another discussion of the legal capacity theory, see Ervin, Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co.: JudicialActivism Run Riot, 22 VAND. L. REv. 485, 495-97 (1969).
' See note 53 supra.
See Larson, The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 470, 488
[hereinafter cited as Larson].
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pretation of the law. Contemporary policy regarding racial discrimination may militate against honoring such intent." It is more accurate and credible to predicate the application of § 1981 to private
discriminatory conduct upon the public policy of eliminating racial
discrimination which has been consistently developed by Congress
and the courts since 1954.2
If the Court had only to determine the intent of the 1866 legislators to establish the scope of § 1981, its conclusion that the section
reached private conduct could be more easily accepted. Compounding the problem, however, is the uncertain statutory source of the
section. The Runyon dissent clearly demonstrates the problem inherent in the majority's conclusion that the statutory roots of § 1981 are
found in both § 16 of the Voting Rights Act of 18701 and § I of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.4
As the dissent indicated, the 1870 Act draws its constitutional
support from the fourteenth admendment.15 The 1866 Act, which was
re-enacted in § 18 of the 1870 Act" to give it a basis in the fourteenth
amendment, 7 originally rested on a thirteenth amendment foundation. 8 An examination of the language used in these statutes reveals
that the wording of § 16 of the 1870 Act" is virtually identical to that
"1 Id. at 489. Justice Stevens revealed a similar perspective in his concurrence in
Runyon by recognizing that "even if Jones did not accurately reflect the sentiments
of the Reconstruction Congress, it surely accords with the prevailing sense of justice
today." 96 S. Ct. at 2604.
62 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), marked the beginning of the new
era of civil rights activism. See generally Private Discrimination,supra note 53.
13 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
" Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
'3 96 S. Ct. at 2609. See PrivateDiscrimination,supra note 53, at 452.
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144, states in part that "the act to
protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and furnish the means of
their vindication, passed April nine, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, is hereby re-

enacted; . ..

."

11See Historical Justification, supra note 53, at 1031; Private Discrimination,
supra note 53, at 452.
LA See Private Discrimination,supra note 53, at 452.
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144, states:
And be it further enacted, That all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have the same right in every State and
Territory in the United States to make and enforce contracts,to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedingsfor the security of person and property as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactionsof every kind, and none other,
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary
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of § 1981.7° Although this language is similar to wording used in § 1
of the 1866 Act,7' which was directed at ensuring the rights of black
citizens, the 1870 Act included the additional wording of § 16 to
protect the civil rights of aliens. 2 Because the wording of § 16 and §
1981 are indistinguishable, Justice White concluded that § 1981 rests
not on the thirteenth amendment foundation of the 1866 Act, but
squarely on the fourteenth amendment through the 1870 Act.73 Thus,
with its constitutional support found solely in the fourteenth amend74
ment, § 1981 cannot reach private conduct.
Support for the dissent's argument can be found in the historical
note following § 1981 .7 When the statutes of the United States were
notwithstanding. No tax or charge shall be imposed or enforced by any
State upon any person immigrating thereto from a foreign country
which is not equally imposed and enforced upon every person immigrating to such State from any other foreign country; and any law of
any State in conflict with this provision is hereby declared null and
void. (Emphasis added.)
70 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), provides in full:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, states:
[Tihat all persons born in the United States and not subject to
any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared
to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and
color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
72 Congress was especially concerned with protecting the immigrant Chinese from
inequitable treatment. See HistoricalJustification,supra note 53, at 1030-36.
11 96 S. Ct. at 2606 n.6. The fourteenth amendment argument was followed previously by the court in Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
aft'd on other grounds, 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972).
71 If § 1981 rested solely on fourteenth amendment grounds, it would be subject
to the state-action limitation and could not reach private action. See note 27 supra.
" See codifier's note on derivation following 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
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revised and codified in 1874, § 1981 (then § 1977) appeared in the
Revised Statutes in its present form along with this historical note
indicating that its predecessor was § 16 of the 1870 Act .7 No codified
section corresponding to the similar language in § 1 of the 1866 Act
appeared. Justice White thus concluded that Congress intended to
repeal this part of the 1866 Act as redundant." On its face, the dissent's argument is quite persuasive. This history of the wording of §
1981 suggests a design to reach an evil independent of discrimination
against blacks.71 There is, however, an assumption of the codifier in
the statute that its words belie. The codifier of the 1874 Revised
Statutes evidently assumed that by the re-enactment of the 1866 Act
in § 18 of the 1870 Act, the fourteenth amendment became the sole
constitutional basis for both statutes. Thus, the similar wording in §
16 of the 1870 Act and § 1 of the 1866 Act apparently persuaded the
codifier that the rights enumerated in the earlier act were subsumed
under the broader language of § 16 of the 1870 Act.79 By ultimately
selecting only the language of § 16, the codifier ignored a widelyaccepted rule of statutory construction that no part of a statute is to
be construed as superfluous."0 Congress intended to protect the rights
of two distinct classes of individuals by enacting these sections,"1 but
the codifier's choice ignored this intent. Whether the omission was by
oversight or design, the codifier's contradiction of congressional intent remains unaltered today."'
The Runyon majority relied on this reasoning in rejecting the
argument that the codification of § 16 of the 1870 Act had impliedly
repealed the similar language of the earlier act. Although a strict
interpretation of the legislative history suggests that § 1981 was derived solely from § 16, the Court's conclusion that § 1981 incorporates
§ 1 of the 1866 Act prevents the extinction of that portion of the 1866
legislation because of the codifier's mistake or oversight.,
" See HistoricalJustification,supra note 53, at 1038.
" 96 S. Ct. at 2612 n.13.
' See note 72 supra.

See HistoricalJustification,supra note 53, at 1038.
See, e.g., Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold and Silver Mining Co., 93 U.S. 634 (1876),
where the Court stated that a familiar rule in the construction of statutes requires
"that they must be so construed to admit all parts of them to stand, if possible." Id.
at 640.
1Section 1 of the 1866 Act was designed to protect the rights of black citizens.
The 1870 Act included the language of § 16 to protect the civil rights of aliens. See
text accompanying notes 71-72 supra.
' See HistoricalJustification,supra note 53, at 1038.
"

96 S. Ct. at 2593 n.8.
"

See HistoricalJustification,supra note 53, at 1039. As Justice Stewart stated,
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Although § 1981 may be construed as incorporating § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, interpreting the scope of that section remains a
problem." The best construction of the statute is one that meets the
difficulties confronting society today rather than those of a century
ago.8 The changing values of American society have permitted an
ever-broadening application of § 1981 to private contractual situations.87 By regarding admission to a private school in terms of a contractual relationship,88 the Court logically expanded the scope of §
1981 with the application of the statute to the discriminatory policies
of the schools.89
Although current circumstances and values suggest the application of § 1981 to private discrimination, countervailing constitutional
considerations may proscribe its application to many private contractual relationships. Concurring in Runyon, Justice Powell expressed
concern that the majority's opinion might be interpreted so broadly
as to infringe the associational and privacy interests inherent in certain relationships. The Runyon Court addressed these concerns as
they related to private schools, but its treatment ascribes to these
considerations far less significance than they merit generally.
The majority in Runyon assumed that the freedom to associate 1
"[t]o hold otherwise would be to attribute to Congress an intent to repeal a major
piece of Reconstruction legislation on the basis of an unexplained omission from the
revisers' marginal notes." 96 S. Ct. at 2593 n.8.
" See text accompanying notes 42-58 supra.
See text accompanying notes 59-62 supra.
67 See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (employment contracts); Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2nd Cir.
1974) (contract for admission to recreational facilities).
11 96 S. Ct. at 2595. Cf. Grier v. Specialized Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856
(W.D.N.C. 1971) (§ 1981 held to prohibit refusal to admit blacks to private barber
school).
" See Alternative Action, supra note 57, at 1376.
60 96 S. Ct. at 2602-03 (Powell, J., concurring). See note 27 supra.
" Freedom of association is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. It was
formally recognized as a constitutional right in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449 (1958). That case held that freedom of association is an inseparable aspect
of the "liberty" assured by fourteenth amendment due process as a right ancillary to
freedom of speech. Id. at 460. The Court held that the fourteenth amendment protects
an association's membership lists from state scrutiny as part of its members' freedom
to associate politically. Id. at 466.
Although NAACP and later cases protected freedom of association in a political
context, it has been recognized to apply in a social context as well. See, e.g., Gilmore
v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973);
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). One court has relied specifically on
the freedom of association to exempt a private social club from the provisions of § 1981.
Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Conn. 1974).

1977]

PRIVATE SCHOOL DISCRIMINATION

incorporates a first amendment right of parents to send their children
to educational institutions advocating racial segregation, and a corresponding right of children to attend such institutions."2 Nevertheless,
the Court held that the freedom of association did not protect the
practice of excluding racial minorities from the schools." The majority did not analyze the issue in depth, however, choosing to support
its holding only with the assertion that racial discrimination is not
entitled to affirmative constitutional protection."
Freedom of association comprises the acts of forming and joining
associations, and the expression of beliefs and ideas through association with others of similar persuasion." Associational expression is
arguably beyond the bounds of government interference, but the act
of associating is within the scope of government regulation when
overriding governmental interests exist." The Supreme Court supported this position in Norwood v. Harrison.7 The Court there stated
that although a private school may exclude certain students to support the concept of segregation in education,98 such exclusion does not
demand constitutional protection." As the Runyon majority noted,'
Norwood further declared that in certain circumstances such discrimination may even be subject to remedial legislation under the enforcement clause of the thirteenth amendment210 These sentiments demFor a discussion of the right of association, see generally Douglas, The Right of
Association, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1361 (1963); Emerson, Freedom of Association and
Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Emerson]; Comment, DiscriminationIn PrivateSocial Clubs: Freedom of Association and Right to
Privacy, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1181.
96 S. Ct. at 2596.
,3Id. See text accompanying notes 103-107 infra.
" 96 S. Ct. at 2597.
' See Private Discrimination,supra note 53, at 520-24; Emerson, supra note 91,
at 21-35.
" See Emerson, supra note 91, at 27. Justice Douglas addressed the issues of
associational expression and action in stating that "the views a citizen entertains, the
beliefs he harbors, the utterances he makes, the ideology he embraces, and the people
he associates with are no concern to government-until and unless he moves into
action." Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1361, 1376 (1963).
-7413 U.S. 455 (1973). In Norwood, the Court considered the constitutionality of
Mississippi's textbook aid program which supplied state-owned textbooks to students
attending segregated private schools. The Court reasoned that by giving tangible aid
in the form of textbooks to schools engaging in discriminatory practices, Mississippi
was supporting such discrimination. Id. at 464-65. Thus, the Court held that such aid
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 466-67.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 470.
96 S. Ct. at 2596-97.
"' Neither the Norwood nor Runyon opinion referred to any circumstances subject
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onstrate that when the exclusive makeup of an organization is the
sole message that it conveys, expression and action become so entwined as to fall outside the absolute protection of the first amendment."0 2
A similar combination of expression and action confronted the
Court in United States v. O'Brien'13 when it determined whether
burning a draft card constituted "symbolic speech" within the protection of the first amendment. Chief Justice Warren separated the
expression and action elements in the conduct by holding that when
a combination of "speech" and "nonspeech" elements exist in the
same course of conduct, incidental limitations on the freedom of
speech may be justified by a sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the non-speech element.' Similarly, the Court
had previously established that a compelling governmental interest
may justify an infringement of first amendment associational freedoms. ' 5 In Runyon, the Court reasoned that although the belief that
segregation is desirable is protected under the freedom of association,
the act of excluding black children from the schools can be restricted
by a sufficient governmental interest.' Such reasoning follows logito thirteen amendment remedial legislation. The logical presumption is that they were
referring to circumstances such as those in Jones which justified the application of §
1982, a statute resting on thirteenth amendment authority. See text accompanying
notes 66-68 supra.
1o2 See Comment, Association, Privacy and the Private Club: The Constitutional
Conflict, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 460, 465 (1970).
'- 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In O'Brien, the Court considered whether burning a draft
card to protest United States involvement in Vietnam was protected by the first
amendment as "symbolic speech." Distinguishing expressive speech from expressive
conduct, the majority held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest
in regulating the non-speech element can justify limitations on first amendment freedoms. Id. at 376. See generally Alfange, Free Speech And Symbolic Conduct: The
Draft Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Velvel, Freedom Of Speech And The
Draft Card Burning Cases, 16 U. KAN. L. Rav. 149 (1968).
101391 U.S. at 376.
" See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958). NAACP
involved an attempt by Alabama to force the plaintiff association to disclose the names
of its members. The Court held that the fourteenth amendment protected the group's
membership rolls from state scrutiny as part of its members' freedom to associate
politically. Id. at 466. See note 91 supra.
Although in NAACP the government failed to demonstrate a compelling interest
superior to the freedom of association, the Court has held that protection of national
security is an interest sufficiently compelling to subordinate the freedom. Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 96-105 (1961).
1" 96 S. Ct. at 2596-97.
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cally from the prior holdings.' 7
In the area of race relations, like other areas involving associational concerns,' 08 the relative merits of each interest must be considered. The right of the government to compel personal associations, as
by forbidding racial discrimination in schools, housing, public facilities and clubs, cannot be defined in absolute terms.' 9 As with other
first amendment freedoms,"' the balancing of state and private interests involved in racial discrimination practiced by private schools is
appropriate."'
Although the Runyon case first put the issue squarely before the
Supreme Court, lower federal courts had alluded to the weight of the
constitutional interests involved in private school discrimination. In
Green v. Connally,"2 a district court considered the associational
interest of private schools in the context of state action through tax
relief. Noting that a compelling governmental interest may limit such
first amendment freedoms as the right of association, the court considered a balancing of interests appropriate."' Supported by the authority of the Civil War Amendments," 4 the court held that the government's interest in the interdiction of racial discrimination was
compelling as well as reasonable and dominated conflicting interests."'
Sending children to segregated private schools can be interpreted
as an act expressive of the parents' views on segregation. Neither the
parents' nor the child's right of association, however, can provide
blanket protection for an act motivated solely by desire to exclude a
"

See text accompanying notes 103-105 supra.

See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1,
88-105 (1961) (political activities); Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961) (professional activities); Railway Employees' Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956)
(union activities).
'" See Emerson, supra note 91, at 20.
"' See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (freedom of speech);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (freedom of religion).
"I See Emerson, supra note 91, at 20-27.
112 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom., Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997
(1971). Green involved a challenge by the parents of black public school students to
the federal tax exemptions granted private schools in Mississippi. The district court
ruled that federal policy against support for racially segregated education prohibits a
construction of the Internal Revenue Code's provisions on charitable exemptions and
deductions which would provide tax relief for segregated private institutions. Id. at
1163-64.
"3 330 F. Supp. at 1167.
...U.S. CONsT. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
"1 330 F. Supp. at 1167.
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racial minority from the school in opposition to strong public policy.
However great an imposition on associational freedoms may occur,
the strong governmental interest in proscribing racial discrimination
in education requires the applicaton of § 1981 in that area.
The Court's application of § 1981 also involved the constitutional
right to privacy' as it relates to private education. When analyzing
the privacy interests involved in private education, the Runyon Court
considered them separately as parental and individual privacy rights.
As the Runyon discussion demonstrates, however, these concepts are
no more than verbal variations of a single constitutional right." 7 Although the majority believed that the application of § 1981 to the
schools' discriminatory conduct infringed no recognized parental prerogatives,"' they acknowledged that the evolving right of privacy
might encompass the parents' decision concerning the nature of
their child's education as an exercise of familial rights and responsibilities."' The Court nevertheless determined that these privacy interests remained within the scope of reasonable government regulation. 2 0
For decades, the right to privacy developed along several distinct
lines of authority rooted in the individual provisions of the Bill of
Rights and the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty.-'
The decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut'- and Roe v. Wade'- succeeded in forging these disparate lines of development into a integrated and broader guarantee of privacy.- 4 The Griswold majority
noted that the penumbras of the specific assurances of the Bill of
Rights create zones of privacy protected from governmental intrusion.- 5 The Roe Court provided some guidance by stating that these
"' See text accompanying notes 121-128 infra. See generally Henkin, Privacy and
Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410 (1974); Note, On Privacy: ConstitutionalProtection For Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 670 (1973).
"7 See 96 S. Ct. at 2598 n.15.
"' Id. at 2597.
' Id. at 2598.
120

Id.

"- See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.

390, 399 (1923) (fourteenth amendment); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)
(first amendment); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968), Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (fourth amendment); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484-85 (1965) (the penumbras of the Bill of Rights).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
in 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
124 See Clark, Constitutional Sources of The PenumbralRight to Privacy, 19 VILL.
L. Rzv. 833, 834 (1974).
"1 381 U.S. at 484. See note 121 supra.
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guarantees of personal privacy include only personal rights that can
be deemed "fundamental."' 26 That Court further held that regulation
limiting these guarantees may be justified solely by a "compelling
state interest."' 27
The scope of the right may be discerned only through an examination of individual cases. Beneath all these decisions exists a noticeable trend to create a sphere of personal and familial interests completely free from government regulation.' With segregated private
schools, the right to privacy principally involves the familial rights
and responsibilities of the parents concerning their child's education.
Perhaps the oldest concept embraced by the right to privacy is the
parents' prerogative to establish a home and bring up children and
the concomitant duty to provide their children with suitable education. 9 The Supreme Court has established the parents' right to send
their child to a private school as a natural incident of this principle.' 0
Nevertheless, parental privacy interests in their children's upbringing and education are not absolute. Roe v. Wade', clearly established that the fundamental rights comprising the right to privacy
may be regulated when the government demonstrates a compelling
interest requiring regulation.3 2 A compelling government interest in
21

410 U.S. at 152. For example, in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court

acknowledged that security of an individual's privacy against arbitrary intrustion by
the police is a fundamental right. Id. at 27-28.
' 410 U.S. at 155. The Roe Court acknowledged that the government's legitimate
interest in protecting the health of a pregnant woman is sufficiently compelling at the
end of the first trimester of pregnancy to infringe the woman's privacy interests by
regulating the abortion procedure. Id. at 163. The Court further determined that a
governmental interest in the potentiality of human life constitutes an interest sufficiently compelling to justify infringing privacy interests by regulating or proscribing
abortion subsequent to viability in the fetus. Id. at 163-64.
'12 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (contraception); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (activities relating to marriage); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
541-42 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) and
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (child rearing and education).
' Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
'' See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Pierceinvolved a challenge
to Oregon's compulsory public education laws as an infringement of the right of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control. The Court held that the fundamental concept of liberty embodied in the
fourteenth amendment excludes any general power of a state to standardize children
by compelling acceptance of instruction only from public teachers. Id. at 535.
131410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"I Id. at 155. See note 127 supra.
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protecting the welfare of children has long been recognized as sufficient grounds for limiting parental freedom and authority when parental decisions may jeopardize a child's health or safety or create
significant social burdens.'33 In accordance with these principles, the
Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder'34 noted that a government may impose
reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education. 11 5 Although in some circumstances the parents' right to raise
their children is beyond government regulation, 3 ' their right to provide a private education for their children is never absolutely free
from governmental control.'3 7 The application of § 1981 to private
school discrimination merely recognizes that the government's goal
of eliminating racial discrimination in the making and enforcement
of contracts for private educational services is a sufficiently compelling interest to justify regulating the character of such education.
The Runyon Court also considered the right to privacy in relation
to the private character of the schools. 3 8 Although the majority opinion did not directly confront the issue of the institutional privacy of
the schools, it clearly suggests that these institutions are not exempt
from the requirements of § 1981 because of any alleged "private"
character.'39 The Court reasoned that the schools' public advertisements and offers of services to all interested whites invalidated any
possible claim of privacy that they might raise.' In so reasoning, the
I See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-71 (1944). In Prince, the Court
considered the appeal of a member of Jehovah's Witnesses from a conviction under
Massachusetts' child labor laws for permitting her daughter to sell the sect's literature
in the street. The case involved a conflict between state authority to protect the welfare
of children and the parent's control over the child and her religious training. The Court
held that the legislation was appropriately designed to protect the child from the
influences of the street and was therefore within the state's police power. Id. at 16869.
" 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Yoder concerned a challenge by Amish parents to Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law under the free exercise clause of the first
amendment. The defendant claimed that public or private high school attendance was
contrary to the Amish way of life. The Court held that the state's interest in universal
education could not subordinate the strong Amish tradition emphasizing a simple way
of life and the significant interest the parents demonstrated with respect to the religious upbringing of their children. Id. at 216-19.
"I Id. at 213.
's See note 134 supra.
See text accompanying notes 110, 131-136 supra.
'
96 S. Ct. at 2595 n.10.
'
139Id.

"I Id. Such reasoning had previously been used to reject claims for exemption
from the provisions of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970),
as private clubs. See, e.g., Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Tex. 1970);
United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1967).
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majority provided some insight into the application of § 1981 to a
contractual relationship involving a purely private organization."'
The Court addressed the issue because defendants in suits under
§ 1981 persistently raise the private character of the institution as a
defense. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964142 provides the key to
this argument by its exemption of private clubs from the scope of its
provisions. 4 3 In both Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation
1 the Court
Association'44 and Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 45
rejected contentions of privacy raised by organizations claiming exemptions from the application of §§ 1981 and 1982. Such claims, in
effect, asserted that the specific provision exempting private clubs
from the action of Title II of the 1964 Act impliedly repealed any
broader construction of §§ 1981 and 1982.111 In both cases, the Court
rejected the organizations' exemption arguments because their memberships were open to all white people within the geographic area
with no selective element present other than race.' Yet by its very
consideration of whether these groups qualified under the exemption,
the Court implied that the exemption might limit the application of
§§ 1981 and 1982.11
"I The issue of whether § 1981 applied to a purely private organization was left
open in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, 410 U.S. 431, 440 (1973).
"4 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970), states in part that "[tihe provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to

the public. . .

."

See note 181 infra.

1 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
"4

396 U.S. 229 (1969).

When two statutes cover the same subject matter or are inconsistent, the later
provision may be characterized as impliedly repealing the former. See Note, The
Desegregationof PrivateSchools: Is Section 1981 TheAnswer?, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1147,
1158-61 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Private Schools]; Note, Section 1981 and Private
Groups: The Right to DiscriminateVersus Freedom from Discrimination,84 YALE L.J.
1441, 1452-55 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Right to Discriminate].
The implied repeal of § 1981 by the provisions of Title VII of the 1964 Act,
prohibiting racial discrimination in employment, is discussed in Note, Is Section 1981
Modified by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1223, 1230-38
(concluding that there is no implied repeal).
"17 410 U.S. at 438; 396 U.S. at 236.
'" At least one federal district court has ruled out that the private club exemption
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must be read as covering § 1981. Cornelius v. Benevolent
Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1201 (D. Conn. 1974). That court ruled
that the associational and privacy interests of the clubs supported the view that they
should be permitted to discriminate with respect to their membership. Id. at 1195.
Reasoning that because a court may consider the provisions of a later act when asked
to extend the language of an earlier act to its literal limits, the district court found it
proper to consider the private club exemption as applying to § 1981. Id. at 1201. Cf.
"'
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Although the Sullivan and Tillman decisions suggested that truly
private organizations'49 might be exempted from § 1981 requirements,
the Runyon Court received the implied repeal argument with guarded
skepticism.' 0 This reaction comports with the Court's policy of regarding implied repeals with disfavor.' In the private school context
of Runyon, the majority justifiably concluded that § 1981 did not
conflict with the private club exemption. The Court noted that Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, of which the private club exemption
is a part, applies to public accommodations and does not reach private schools. 52 Furthermore, when Congress passed the exemption in
1964 the broad application of § 1981 had not yet begun. Only a virtually incredible interpretation of the legislative history could find
the implicit intent of the legislators to repeal a construction of § 1981
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 193-94 (1967) (stating that courts may
consider a later act when asked to extend an earlier act's vague language to its literal
limits). Similarly, the Cornelius court declared that standard rules of construction
indicated that the specific provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exempting private
organizations from the scope of that act should prevail over the more general language
of § 1981. 382 F. Supp. at 1201. Cf. Kemper v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 125 (1904)
(stating that specific terms covering a given subject matter prevail over general language of the same or other statute which might otherwise prove controlling). The court
also found that the legislative history of the 1964 Act evinced a clear intent to protect
the substantial privacy interests of such organizations through the exemption. 382 F.
Supp. at 1201. Concluding that since no compelling governmental interest diminished
the significance of these interests, the court held that the statute risked being an
unconstitutional infringement of the organizations' privacy rights. To prevent such a
result, the private club exemption was applied to § 1981. Id. at 1202-03.
Although the court detailed its reasoning supporting the substantial privacy interests of private clubs, only a brief discussion buttressed its assertion that the government's interest was far from compelling. See id. at 1202-03. Nevertheless, the caveat
at the end of the opinion, stating that the organizations must maintain their social
rather than business emphasis, reveals the court's basic assumption in the decision.
The court strongly emphasized that racial prejudice would not be allowed to affect
commerce and that the clubs would cease to be exempt from the application of § 1981
if economic opportunity became their principal attraction. Id. at 1204. This caveat
implies that the compelling government interest associated with § 1981 involves the
protection of economic equality. See text accompanying notes 158-164 infra. For a
discussion of the necessity of balancing the strength of the privacy interest against the
compelling nature of the government's interest see text accompanying notes 131-137
supra.
" A truly private club is one that is clearly not open to the public. See note 181
infra.
'

0 96 S. Ct. at 2595 n.10.

See, e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939); Posadas v.
National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
'5,

5

96 S. Ct. 2595 n.10.
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that would be proposed five years in the future.'53 As in Tillman and
Sullivan, however, the Runyon Court declined to resolve the issue
since the public character of their advertising and services prevented
the schools from raising a defense of organizational privacy.'54
Although the Runyon decision leaves the implied repeal issue and
some other questions unanswered, 1 5 the Court's expanded applicaI= See Right to Discriminate,supra note

146, at 1453-54.
Is' 96 S. Ct. at 2595 n.10.
I's The Runyon majority applied § 1981 to prohibit "racial discrimination that
interferes with the making and enforcement of contracts for private educational services." 96 S. Ct. at 2598. Because Runyon dealt with racial discrimination as the sole
basis for exclusion, this ruling does not solve the problem of whether § 1981 will apply
when race is but one consideration among several that'prevents the making of a private
education contract. One court has confronted the issue, however, and, following
Runyon, held "that racial discrimination arises where . . . race [is] 'at least one of
the factors which motivated the defendant's action in denying [the plaintiff] admission to the school.'" Riley v. Adirondack S. School for Girls, 541 F.2d 1124, 1126 (5th
Cir. 1976), rev'g 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (quoting 368 F. Supp. at 395).
Although factually it may be argued that Riley involved race as the sole basis of
exclusion, the court clearly indicated that § 1981 prohibits any consideration of the
applicant's race. 541 F.2d at 1126. Cf. Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344
(7th Cir. 1970) (refusal to lease found discriminatory even though race only one factor
in the refusal).
The Runyon Court also left unanswered the question whether a private school that
is in fact not open to the public will be exempt from the provisions of § 1981. By
emphasizing that the case did not involve the issue of organizational privacy because
the schools had offered their services to the general public, the Court permitted the
inference that a school with a credible claim of associational privacy might successfully
assert such a claim. 96 S. Ct. at 2595 n.10. To qualify for exemption as a truly private
organization, the school's associational rather than educational interests must be its
principal goal. When this happens, however, the institution has crossed the line dividing schools and clubs and probably will not receive state certification as a legitimate
educational institution. In that situation its reason for existence will have vanished.
See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra. Furthermore, it is doubtful that such a school
could demonstrate the characteristics required of a truly private organization. See note
148 supra; note 181 infra. In view of the substantial associational and privacy interests
necessary to qualify as a truly private club, segregated schools probably will not succeed with such a defense. See Private Schools, supra note 146, at 1173-75; text accompanying notes 171-173 infra. As long as the educational function is paramount, the
schools will be subject to government regulation. See text accompanying notes 112-115,
131-137 supra; notes 171-173 infra.
A further problem that may result from the Runyon decision is the practical effect
of the majority's acknowledgement that private schools "remain presumptively free to
inculcate whatever standards they deem desirable." 96 S. Ct. at 2597. Although
Runyon opens private schools to black students few may choose to enter if the schools
assert their freedom to convey the concept of "white supremacy" through their teachings. A person who must constantly confront the idea that he is inferior because of his
race may swiftly find the atmosphere of the school unappealing. Even though Runyon
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tion of § 1981156 effectively ends the long struggle against racial discrimination in private education. The majority opinion, however,
indicates no limit to the statute's scope. Parameters must be drawn
to prevent the right to contract from encroaching seriously upon associational and privacy interests. 57
To be effective, any circumscription of § 1981 rights must recognize the character of the significant interests involved. Since Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,' 58 the interpretation that § 1981 confers only
the legal capacity to contract has been largely ignored. 59 By going
beyond the legal capacity construction and imposing an affirmative
obligation to contract regardless of race,' the thrust of Jones and its
progeny has been directed at enabling black people to achieve "economic equality"'' through suits under §§ 1981 and 1982. As Runyon
and earlier cases indicate,"12 a badge of slavery under § 1981 consists
of any racially-based refusal to enter into a contractual relationship."' This expanded definition of the badge of slavery concept implies that § 1981 applies to contractual relationships that are dominated by non-personal, economic factors." 4 Juxtaposed against these
economic factors are relationships dominated by organizational privacy concerns such as those claimed in Tillman and Sullivan."' To
guarantees the black student the right to contract with private schools for educational
services, the character of those services could practically inhibit any exercise of this
right. Confronting this issue will require a balancing of conflicting interests much
stronger than any the Court has previously faced in this context.
' See cases cited note 87 supra.
,s See 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2602-03 (Powell J., concurring).
392 U.S. 409 (1968).
's' See note 42 supra.
,' See Buchanan, FederalRegulation Of PrivateRacial Prejudice:A Study of Law
in Search of Morality, 56 IowA L. Rav. 473, 504-12 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Buchanan].
"' See note 48 supra.
12 See cases cited note 45 supra.
"6 See Buchanan, supra note 160, at 506-07.
"'
Id. As construed by the Court in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20-24
(1883), the term "badges and incidents of slavery" extended only to deprivations of
the fundamental legal rights that were characteristic of the institution of slavery. This
interpretation prevailed until expanded by the Jones Court to include a broader range
of opportunities. See note 42 supra. Justice Stewart's statement in Jones that § 1982
is intended to assure "that a dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase the same
thing as a dollar in the hands of a white man," 392 U.S. at 443, demonstrates that
equality of economic opportunity is now a goal to be achieved through the elimination
of badges of slavery. The Runyon Court's reliance on this statement indicates that this
goal is likewise embodied in § 1981. See 96 S. Ct. at 2598.
"I See text accompanying notes 141-148 supra.
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consider adequately the relevant constitutional interests, the nature
of these relationships must be the governing principle behind any
concept limiting § 1981. Therefore, applying an associational versus
economic 6' test to determine the nature of the relationship involved
would serve as an appropriate model to establish the parameters of
§ 1981.
Courts have approached the conflicting constitutional interests
involved in a broad range of § 1981 claims through an analysis of the
associational and economic interests. In Corneliusv. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 117 the court recognized that the fundamental
conflict presented in applying § 1981 to private social clubs lies in the
tension between the government's interests in promoting economic
equality and the clubs' interests in organizational privacy.6 8 The
substantial associational interests of private clubs persuaded the
court that they were beyond the scope of § 1981, but it emphasized
that governmental regulation would be justified whenever those interests were subordinated to economic concerns.' 69 In the sale of housing, however, the dominance of the economic interests of both the
seller and the purchaser justifies regulation.' As these examples
demonstrate, balancing the relevant associational and economic interests aids the resolution of claims under § 1981 in a broad range of
contexts.
In the context of the Runyon case, the associational versus economic test suggests that the Court properly concluded that the
schools' discriminatory admissions policies violated § 1981. The majority characterized the relationship concerned as one principally involving payments by the students for educational services rendered
by the schools. 7' Thus, the relationship was found to be basically
contractual. This finding was not novel, however, since the Court has
previously regarded private schools as businesses and their relationship with students and parents as contractual in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters. 2 Because economic concerns predominate, the government's
" See Buchanan, supra note 160, at 508-10.
",
"
"I

382 F. Supp. 1182 (D.Conn. 1974). See note 148 supra.
See id. at 1202-03.
!d.

See Buchanan, supra note 160, at 506-07.
96 S. Ct. at 2595.
" 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). See note 130 supra. Various state courts have also
characterized the relationship between a private school and a student as contractual.
See, e.g., Albert Merrill School v. Godoy, 78 Misc. 2d 647, 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Cir. Ct.
N.Y. City 1974); Rosenbaum v. Riverside Military Academy, 93 Ga. App. 651, 92
S.E.2d 541 (1956).
'~'
'
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compelling interest in eliminating racial discrimination from such
relationships outweighs any ancillary associational or privacy claims
balanced against it.' By this reasoning, the Runyon Court properly
permitted the plaintiff to recover.
As the Cornelius decision indicates, discrimination by private
clubs is equally susceptible to the association versus economic test.'
Although justifying protection of the organization's interests by incorporating the private club exemption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
into § 1981 may be improper, 75 the same associational freedom that
induced the exemption warrants such protection.' The significance
of the interests protecting the discriminatory practices of private
clubs derives from their constitutional basis and is independent of the
implied repeal argument.
The associational versus economic model conforms with traditional legal approaches to private discrimination. Private club discrimination has been considered under three legal theories: the stateaction approach,' 77 the definitional approach, 78 and the badge of slavery approach adopted by the Runyon Court.'79 The state-action approach was discredited in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.'10 Both the
definitional and the badge of slavery concepts, however, are expressed by considering private club discrimination in the context of
the associational and economic interests involved.
To apply the test effectively, a standard must be devised to identify the nature of these associational and privacy interests. Combining the definitional and badge of slavery concepts adequately solves
the problem. Since the private club exemption was designed to protect such interests, criteria developed under the exemption are effec"I See Buchanan, supra note 160, at 511; PrivateDiscrimination,Fourth Circuit
Review, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 472, 479 (1976).
'7 See Buchanan, supra note 160, at 507.
,: See text accompanying notes 138-154 supra.
't' See Note, The Private Club Exemption To The Civil Rights Act of 1964: A
Study in Judicial Confusion, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1112, 1121-22 (1969) (concluding that
the congressional debates evince a clear intent to protect freedom of association
through the private club exemption).
'
See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
'
See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); United States v. Jack Sabin's Private
Club, 265 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1967).
"I See 96 S. Ct. at 2593-96. See generallyNote, ConstitutionalLaw-PrivateClub
Discrimination, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 595.
S 407 U.S. 163 (1972). In Moose Lodge, the Court rejected the argument that
issuance of a state liquor license constituted sufficient state action to prohibit discrimination. Id. at 173.
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tive tools for evaluating the character of these organizations.' 8' The
size, selectivity and nature of control of the organization are particulhrly helpful in establishing the existence of a truly private club.," If
a survey of these criteria reveals that an organization's principal
objective is the common enjoyment of interpersonal relationships in
the course of any activity, the club's associational interests should be
recognized as paramount, and it should be free from governmental
interference. If, however, the club or association essentially supplies
certain services or facilities in exchange for the payment of dues, then
membership essentially constitutes the making of a contract to obtain something of value in return for a money payment.' 3 In that
event, the relationship should be considered predominantly economic
and the discriminatory policies prohibited under § 1981 as a badge
of slavery.
As with all tests, certain relationships will defy categorization
under the associational-economic model. Justice Powell's example of
the private music class is one such relationship.' 4 Although essentially a contractual exchange of money for services, the personal nature of the instruction suggests that the associational interests in"' Generally accepted criteria for determining a private club are: (1) whether it
was formed because of a common associational interest among the members, see
United States v. Northwest La. Restaurant Club, 256 F. Supp. 151 (W.D. La. 1966);
(2) whether it carefully screens applicants for membership and selects new members
with reference to the common intimacy of association, see Wright v. Cork Club, 315
F. Supp. 1143, 1152-53 (S.D. Tex. 1970); (3) whether the facilities or services of the
organization are limited strictly to members and bona fide guests, see Stout v. Young
Men's Christian Ass'n, 404 F.2d 687, 698 (5th Cir. 1968); (4) whether the organization
is controlled by the membership in general meetings, see United States v. Jack Sabin's
Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90, 93 (E.D. La. 1967); (5) whether the membership is
limited to a number small enough to allow full membership participation and to insure
that all members share the common associational bond, see Nesmith v. Young Men's
Christian Ass'n, 397 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1968); (6) whether it is non-profit and
operated solely for the benefit of its members, see United States v. Jack Sabin's Private
Club, 265 F. Supp. 90, 94 (E.D. La. 1967); and (7) whether its publicity, if any, is
directed only to members for their information, see Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp.
1143, 1156 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
All of these criteria are not applicable in every situation and the absence of one
does not necessarily indicate that an organization is not a truly private club. Their
application requires a case-by-case approach to the problem. See Comment, Public
Accommodations: What Is a Private Club?, 30 MONT. L. REv. 47, 58 (1968). See also
Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1203-04 (D. Conn.
1975).
"I See Comment, Public Accommodations: What Is A Private Club?, 30 MONT.
L. REv. 47, 57 (1968).
'
See Larson, supra note 60, at 502.
'
See 96 S. Ct. at 2603 (Powell, J., concurring).
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volved may be more significant. Likewise, although a portrait painter
receives a commission for his work, if the subject matter disgusts his
associational preferences, the portrait will likely be a failure.', The
basic difficulty with this type of relationship is that although it is of
a contractual character, associational preferences are inextricably
woven into the consideration. Although the model weakens in the face
of such a problem, the vast majority of private relationships possibly
involving racial discrimination violative of § 1981 may properly be
evaluated according to their associational or economic nature.
Runyon v. McCrary effects a justifiable expansion of the scope of
§ 1981 to include the racially discriminatory admissions policies of
private schools. The predominantly economic character of such institutions properly brings them within reasonable government regulation concerning these policies. Countervailing constitutionally protected interests of association and privacy, however, require definition of the scope of the policy of eliminating racial discrimination in
private relationships. The nature of the realationship challenged
under § 1981 must be examined to identify the relevant interests
involved. Applying the associational versus economic test provides an
effective guideline for the judicial task of establishing these limits.
THOMAS M.
" See Buchanan, supra note 160, at 507.
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